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This paper shows that a ﬁrm prefers a process-based task assign-
ment compared to a function based one if the tasks are from functional
areas which are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. We
consider several projects with contributions from several functional ar-
eas. The organization can be structured along processes like product
lines (M-form) or along functional areas like marketing or production
(U-form). The U-form enables cost savings due to specialization or
scale economies. We show that the more eﬀective incentives under the
M-form might outweigh these savings if the functions are neither too
complementary nor too substitutable.
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This paper shows that a ﬁrm prefers a process-based task assignment com-
pared to a function based one if the tasks are from functional areas which are
neither too complementary nor too substitutable. We consider an organiza-
tion or ﬁrm which undertakes several independent projects (e.g. distributes
several products) each of which requires contributions from several functional
areas (e.g. manufacturing and marketing). Under the unitary form (U-form),
the ﬁrm is structured along functional areas so that there is, for example, a
marketing department and a manufacturing department. Under the multi-
level form (M-form), the ﬁrm has a process-based structure, it is organized
along projects. For example, each product has its own department which is
in charge of all tasks related to this product. While the U-form provides some
cost savings due to specialization or economies of scale, the M-form enables
more eﬀective incentives in case of incomplete contracts. We show that this
might outweigh the potential cost savings from the U-form, if the functions
are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. Strong substitutability
or complementarity of the functional areas makes it easier for the principal
to implement her favorite eﬀort levels. Incentives become less important and
the M-form cannot be optimal in these cases.
We use a simple model of the assignment of tasks to analyze the optimal
organizational form with the focus on the substitutability resp. complemen-
tarity of the functional areas. Our model considers a principal, e.g. a ﬁrm
owner, who hires two agents for the implementation of two projects, e.g. the
distribution of two diﬀerent products. Each project consists of two tasks from
diﬀerent functional areas like manufacturing and marketing. The principal
assigns the tasks to the agents. We assume that tasks cannot be split among
several agents.1 Under the U-form, each agent works on tasks from the same
functional area, while under the M-form, each agent works on tasks from the
same project.
The agents’ eﬀort is assumed to be non-contractible. Eﬀort might be
unobservable to a third party or unveriﬁable in court. The principal needs
to provide incentives in order to induce the agents to spend eﬀort. Moral
hazard (hidden action problem) occurs. The agents are risk neutral and pro-
tected by limited liability.2 Either the agent cannot conduct any payments
1Since Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) as well as Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett
(2005) show that it is never optimal to split a task among several agents, our assumption
seems justiﬁed.
2This moral hazard problem was introduced by Sappington (1983) for a single agent.
2due to wealth constraints or ex post payments cannot be enforced so that
the agent could break up the contract and walk away instead of paying. The
principal faces a trade oﬀ between rent extraction and surplus maximization
which occurs in our model under both organizational forms. The agents’
eﬀort choice is a non-cooperative game designed by the principal through
the payment scheme. Winter (2004) shows that it might be necessary to
discriminate between the agents if a unique Nash equilibrium in which all
agents exert eﬀort is desired. To avoid related issues, we assume that the
principal can pick the equilibrium of her choice in case of mutliple equilibria.
As a justiﬁcation, think of the principal announcing the eﬀort levels of her
favorite equilibrium and the agents following her recommendation because
they cannot gain from deviating unilaterally.
The output of the projects is assumed to be the only veriﬁable variable
on which payments can condition. Under the U-form, each agent’s payoﬀ de-
pends on both agent’s actions, while under the M-form, it is independent of
the other agent’s actions.3 Therefore, we have more eﬀective incentives under
the M-form. On the other hand, each agent is specialized in one functional
area so that his eﬀort costs are lower if working on a task from this area.4
For example, the agents are a marketing director and a technical engineer
specialized in manufacturing. A slightly diﬀerent interpretation is to assume
some economies of scale so that an agent working on two tasks form the
same function has lower costs than an agent working on tasks from diﬀerent
functions. Under the U-form, the principal can gain from the resulting cost
savings. The principal’s trade oﬀ is to balance between cost savings under
the U-form and more eﬀective incentives under the M-form.
If there is a lot of complementarity between the tasks of a project, it is not
expensive to provide incentives. Increasing incentives on one task results in
increased incentives on the complementary task. The M-form’s advantage of
more eﬀective incentives is less important and the U-form is optimal because
of the cost savings. On the other hand, if there is a lot of substitutability,
it is suﬃcient for the principal to induce high eﬀort on one task per project.
Incentives play a minor role and the U-form is optimal. Only in case of lit-
tle substitutability and little complementarity, the M-form might be optimal.
3Corts (2006) applies the term individual accountability to the M-form and team ac-
countability for the U-form.
4Note that the term specialization refers to the agents’ eﬀort cost functions in our
model, while Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) use it do describe that a task is not split
among several agents.
3Beginning with Chandler (1962), several papers deal with the potential
advantages of the diﬀerent organizational forms, especially the M- and U-
form. Most of the given applications as in Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett
(2005), Corts (2006) and other papers describe a ﬁrm which is organized
along process-based resp. functional lines, but there are other applications.
For example, Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) apply the idea of M- and U-form
to planned economies. While the Soviet Union had a centralized structure
with ministries for the diﬀerent industries which correspond to the functional
areas, the Chinese economy is organized in decentralized regions correspond-
ing to the projects. Furthermore, not only ﬁrms but any kind of organizaton
or institution deals task assignment or composition of teams.
As Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) emphasize, the assignment of tasks is not
necessarily the only diﬀerence between the two organizational forms. While
the U-form is used to represent a centralized structure, the M-form describes
a decentralized organization with several more or less independent units. To
reﬂect this diﬀerences requires complex hierarchies as in, for example, Hart
and Moore (2005). In Qian, Roland, and Xu (2006), the diﬀerent levels of
centralization imply diﬀerences between the two forms concerning the in-
formational structure and the ability to coordinate actions. The top level
manager has diﬀerent roles under the diﬀerent forms, which is also the case
in Aghion and Tirole (1995). As Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005),
we abstract from such organizational diﬀerences and restrict our attention to
the assignment of tasks. We do not explicitly model (de)centralization, but
use a simple one-layer hierarchy. Nevertheless, we continue to use the terms
M- and U-form for process-based resp. functional organization structures.
The cost savings under the U-form as well as the more eﬀective incentives
under the M-form might well be viewed as a result of diﬀerent levels of cen-
tralization.
Diﬀerent from our model, Corts (2006) or Besanko, Regibeau, and Rock-
ett (2005) analyze M- and U-form with risk averse agents so that the principal
faces a trade oﬀ between the allocation of risk and the provision of incen-
tives as in the classical moral hazard model of Holmstrom (1979). Diﬀerent
form their approach, but similar to our limited liability assumption, Maskin,
Qian, and Xu (2000) impose an upper bound on penalties when analyzing
the organizational form.
It is common in the literature to assume that the U-form gives rise to
economies of scale due to centralization, see for example Qian, Roland, and
Xu (2006), or equivalently to assume that the M-form suﬀers from some dis-
4economies of span, as in Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005).
Under the M-form, a multi-task problem as analyzed in Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991) can occur. An agent who has to exert unobservable eﬀort
on several tasks allocates eﬀort among the tasks in a way which optimizes
the signal on which his wage is based. If this signal is only partially aligned
with the organization’s objective, this allocation is ineﬃcient. In the model
of Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005), the U-form can dominate the
M-form because of what they call the incentive ﬂexibility eﬀect. Under the
U-form, payment schemes are more ﬂexible since the principal can inﬂuence
the eﬀort on every single task instead of whole projects only. This holds true
for our model, but does not play a role for the optimality of either form since
we do not have any kind of multi-task problem. Allowing for asymmetries
or externalities could create such a multi-task problem and shift our results
towards the U-form, as in Corts (2006). Diﬀerently from Besanko, Regibeau,
and Rockett (2005), we have no correlation between the outputs, no func-
tional asymmetry or cross-product externality which could favor either form.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) point out that a team problem as described
in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) might occur under the U-form. Even if the
project output reveals that there was shirking, the principal cannot detect
who has shirked. Diﬀerent from the M-form, free riding is possible under
the U-form. As Holmstrom (1982) shows, the principal can solve the moral
hazard in teams by breaking the budget balance condition. This enables a
payment scheme which gives each agent a marginal reward equal to marginal
costs for the eﬃcient eﬀort choice. In Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005),
the principal can use such a payment scheme to overcome the team problem
and extract the whole surplus through lump-sum payments of the agents. In
our model, limited liability prevents the agents from such payments. Due to
the additional possibility of free riding, moral hazard is more severe under
the U-form than under the M-form so that the M-form provides more eﬀec-
tive incentives.
Similarly, in Aghion and Tirole (1995), Corts (2006) and Besanko, Reg-
ibeau, and Rockett (2005) the incentives under the M-form are more eﬀective
than under the U-form. Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) consider a model in
which the available information about the agents’ performance is diﬀerent
for M- and U-form. The M-form enables more eﬀective incentives if it pro-
vides more precise information. Together with the fact that it is quite easy
to measure the impact of a certain product on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt but rather
hard to measure the impact of a functional area, it seems reasonable that the
5M-form enables more eﬀective incentives than the U-form. Winter (2005)
studies the impact of information about the other agents’ eﬀorts, especially
due to collocation, and also ﬁnds that the M-form can provide more eﬀec-
tive incentives. While Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) and Qian, Roland, and
Xu (2006) assume that the organizational form changes the informational
structure, we take the informational structure as given independent of the
organizational form. To this respect, our model is similar to Besanko, Reg-
ibeau, and Rockett (2005).
Several trade oﬀs between the two forms have been analyzed in the lit-
erature. In Corts (2006), the M-form provides better incentives, while the
U-form helps to overcome the multi-task problem and improves the alloca-
tion of risk. Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005) analyze a similar trade
oﬀ and show that asymmetries between functions and cross-product exter-
nalities might favor the U-form. In diﬀerence, our basic trade oﬀ is between
cost savings due to scale economies or specialization under the U-form and
more eﬀective incentives under the M-form. This trade oﬀ is also used by,
for example, Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000). Similarly, Goldfain (2006) com-
pares several organizational forms of a research project. Hiring a team of
agents, which is comparable with our U-form, allows to gain from synergies
but weakens the incentives in her model. Aghion and Tirole (1995) consider
a similar trade oﬀ in a framework of information aquisition. Based on the
diﬀerence between formal and real authority as introduced in Aghion and
Tirole (1997) and its predecessors, the model of Aghion and Tirole (1995)
shows that information acquisition increases the principal’s overload under
the U-form compared to the M-form. This is in line with the overload con-
siderations of Williamson (1975). In Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005),
synergies are not due to the organizational form itself. The organizational
form impacts the communication of private information, which is important
for the possible implementation of synergies. Overload considerations as well
as coordination problems do not play a role in our model. There is no private
information or communication.
Most of the literature mentioned above simply assumes constant marginal
returns to eﬀort. Qian, Roland, and Xu (2006) assume complementary func-
tions and substitutable projects, but follow a team-theoretic approach as
discussed in Marschak and Radner (1972). That is, they abstract from any
incentive problems and focus on coordination and communication. Winter
(2005) considers incentives, but also assumes complementary functions and
substitutable projects. In diﬀerence, our contribution is to explicitly model
how eﬀort spent on one functional area aﬀects the marginal returns to eﬀort
6of the other functional area and study the impact in the context of incentives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a multi-
ple principal agent model which covers the diﬀerent organizational forms. In
section 3, the benchmark case of contractible eﬀort is considered for exoge-
nous as well as endogenous assignment of task. The case of non-contractible
eﬀort and exogenously given organizational form is analyzed in section 4 for
the M-form and in section 5 for the U-form. In section 6, the assignment of
tasks is endogenized in order to ﬁnd the optimal organizational form. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a principal who undertakes two projects A and B. On each project,
two tasks from diﬀerent functional areas S and T have to be performed. This
results in the four tasks AS,AT,BS and BT. We refer to AS and AT as
the A-tasks, AS and BS as the S-tasks and so forth. For example, each
project might represent a product while the tasks are production and mar-
keting. If the principal distributes cars and chocolate, there are four tasks to
be executed: production of cars, marketing of cars, marketing of chocolate
and production of chocolate. The example is enhanced further below. For
exogenous reasons, e.g. time constraints, the principal cannot work on the
projects herself but hires two agents σ and τ. In principle, both agents are
able to do each of the four tasks.
The timing is as follows: The principal oﬀers a contract to the agents. The
contract assigns the tasks to the agents and determines a payment scheme.
If eﬀort is contractible, it is determined in the contract. The agents accept
if their participation constraints are fulﬁlled. In case of non-contractible ef-
fort, the agents choose their eﬀorts simultaneously. Projects are undertaken,
private costs occur and project outputs are realized. The payment scheme is
executed. The details are given in the remaining section.
We assume that each task is assigned to exactly one agent. For each task
he is assigned to, an agent chooses how much eﬀort to spend on this task.
To keep things simple, we assume a binary eﬀort choice. The agent chooses
between high eﬀort eh and low eﬀort el with eh > el > 0. Denote with
eAS,eAT,eBS,eBT the eﬀort spent on the respective tasks and with eSi,eTi
the sum of eﬀort agent i spends on the S-tasks resp. the T-tasks. If, for
example, agent σ is assigned to the tasks AS and BS and exerts high eﬀort
7on both tasks, we have eSσ = eAS + eBS = 2eh and eTσ = 0.
The agents incur private, unobservable eﬀort costs which are assumed to











We assume each agent to be specialized in one function meaning that his
eﬀort costs on tasks with this function are lower. The parameters 0 < α < β
reﬂect the agents’ specialization. For agent σ it is less costly to spend eﬀort
on the S-tasks than on the T-tasks, while for agent τ it is the other way
around. The smaller α, the higher is the level of specialization. One possible
interpretation is that the agent is more familiar with one of the functions and
therefore needs less time to undertake the respective tasks. In this setting,
we have to assume the principal to know who is specialized in which function
if she wants to beneﬁt from the specialization. But a similar idea is to assume
some economies of scale so that an agent working on tasks from the same
functional area has lower costs than an agent working on tasks from diﬀerent
functions. This does not require the principal to know the agents’ abilities,
but adds some notational complications with respect to the cost functions.5
Up to some permutations, the results do not change.
Each project either succeeds or fails. If project A is successful, the prin-
cipal receives an output X > 0. In case of failure, no output is generated.
The success probability of project A is πA(eAS,eAT) which depends on the
eﬀort spent on the A-tasks. It is
πA(el,el) = pl ,
πA(eh,el) = pm ,
πA(el,eh) = pm ,
πA(eh,eh) = ph . (2)
Since the success probability is determined by the sum of eﬀort spent on this
project, the principal does not care about how a certain amount of eﬀort
might be allocated among the A-tasks. There is no multitask problem ` a la
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Due to the binary structure, the sum of ef-
fort is equivalent to the number of high eﬀort levels. The succes probability
5If three tasks are assigned to one agent, the question arises which of the tasks are the
low-cost tasks for this agent. No matter how this question is answered, such a solution
turns out to be dominated with respect to the principal’s payoﬀ as well as the overall
surplus.
8does not depend on who spends eﬀort on the project. The agents’ special-
ization (resp. the scale economies) is reﬂected by the cost functions but does
not inﬂuence the project output. Furthermore, the project is symmetric in
functions. In case of one A-task undertaken with high eﬀort and the other
A-task undertaken with low eﬀort, it makes no diﬀerence which of the two
tasks is undertaken with high eﬀort.
We assume
1 > ph > pm > pl ≥ 0 (3)
so that πA increases in the sum of eﬀort spent on the A-tasks. Given AS is
done with low eﬀort, switching from low to high eﬀort on AT increases πA
by pm − pl. Given AS is undertaken with high eﬀort, a switch from low to
high eﬀort on AT increases the success probability by ph − pm. If
pm > (ph + pl)/2 , (4)
we have ph − pm < pm − pl and marginal returns to eﬀort are decreasing. In
this case, we deﬁne the two tasks to be substitutes. In case of
pm < (ph + pl)/2 , (5)
marginal returns to eﬀort are increasing and the two tasks are complements.
To simplify calculations, we set
pl = 0 . (6)
The two projects are completely identical so that project B’s output is
also X > 0 resp. zero and its success probability function πB(eBS,eBT) is
analog to πA. This implies that the A-tasks are substitutes if and only if
the B-tasks are substitutes and we can consider the functions S and T it-
self to be substitutes resp. complements. Note that the output of a project
depends neither on the other project’s output nor on the eﬀort spent on the
other project. This is reasonable in our example since the market success of
chocolate is likely to be uncorrelated to the market success of cars. To avoid
rather uninteresting corner solutions, we assume phX > (α + β)eh.
The project output is assumed to be veriﬁable so that payments can
condition on it. Denote with vj an unconditional transfer payment from the
principal to agent j and with wij a payment from the principal to agent j
paid if project i succeeds.6 The whole payment scheme is given by the vector
6This payment scheme is equivalent to paying each agent for each project a wage which
depends on the success or failure of this project. To verify this, rearrange the payoﬀ
functions. Furthermore, neither the principal’s payoﬀ nor the surplus can be increased by
using a more advanced payment scheme.
9W = (vσ,wAσ,wBσ,vτ,wAτ,wBτ). We assume the agents to be of limited
liability, maybe due to wealth constraints, so that all these payments have
to be non-negative. We refer to vj as agent j’s basic wage and to wij as
his success premium on project i. The principal and the agents are assumed
to be risk neutral. Their payoﬀ functions are composed of their expected
beneﬁts resp. payments and the private costs so that they are given by
Uσ = πA(eAS,eAT)wAσ + πB(eBS,eBT)wBσ + vσ − αe
Sσ − βe
Tσ , (7)




UP = πA(eAS,eAT)(X − wAσ − wAτ)
+ πB(eBS,eBT)(X − wBσ − wBτ) − vσ − vτ . (9)
The agents’ outside options are assumed to be zero. The principal oﬀers a
contract to the agents who accept if and only if their participation constraints
Uσ,Uτ ≥ 0 are fulﬁlled. A contract consists of an assignment of tasks and
a payment scheme. If eﬀort is contractible, it is determined in the contract
as well. In case of non-contractible eﬀort, the agents choose their eﬀorts
simultaneously. Given the assignment of tasks and the payment scheme,
this is a non-cooperative game and we assume the agents to play a Nash
equilibrium. Given an assignment of tasks, denote with ei the vector of
eﬀorts agent i has to choose. For example, if agent σ is assigned to AS and















For notational simplicity, we widely omit the asterisk. The equilibrium out-
come is anticipated by the principal. When she designs the contract, in fact
she designs the game by choosing an assignment of tasks and a payment
scheme. In case of multiple equilibria, the principal determines which equi-
librium is played. The principal oﬀers a contract which maximizes her own
payoﬀ subject to the agents’ participation constraints, the equilibrium con-
ditions and the limited liability constraints. Such a contract is called optimal.
Overall expected surplus is





An assignment of tasks together with a combination of eﬀorts which maxi-
mizes the surplus is called ﬁrst best eﬃcient.
10The following sections analyze and compare diﬀerent assignments of tasks,
which describe diﬀerent organizational structures of the principal’s ﬁrm. We
restrict our attention to situations in which each agent is in charge of two
tasks.7 If one agent receives both A-tasks while the other agent gets both
B-tasks, this is called multi-level form or M-form. In our example, this
form describes an organizational structure along product lines. One agent is
completely responsible for cars, concerning marketing as well as production,
while the other agent has to care about chocolate. Instead, if one agent
receives both S-tasks while the other one gets both T-tasks, the structure is
called unitary form or U-form. Each agent is in charge of a speciﬁc function,
which we assume to be his low-cost function.8 In our example, one agent
is responsible for the production of both cars and chocolate while the other
agent is concerned with the marketing of both products.
3 Contractible Eﬀort
This section studies the benchmark cases of contractible eﬀort. Lemma 1
and 2 take the organizational form as exogenously given, while Proposition
1 endogenizes the assignment of tasks.
Lemma 1 (M-Form) Let the tasks be exogenously assigned according to the
M-form. Performing all tasks with high eﬀort creates the surplus
S
M4 := 2(phX − (α + β)eh) , (12)
while performing only the low-cost tasks with high eﬀort results in the surplus
S
M2 := 2(pmX − αeh − βel) . (13)
Exerting high eﬀort on all tasks maximizes the surplus if and only if
pm ≤ ph −
β(eh − el)
X
=: ¯ pm (14)
while spending high eﬀort only on each agent’s low-cost task maximizes the




M4} ≥ 0 . (15)
Proof: see Appendix A.
7Any other organizational form within our framework can improve neither the princi-
pal’s payoﬀ nor the surplus.
8This is in line with the idea of scale economies determining the cost functions. In case
of specialization, assigning each agent to his high-cost tasks could be viewed as a U-form
as well and provides the analog results but with higher costs.
11Due to the symmetry, the surplus-maximizing number of high eﬀort levels per
project is the same for both projects. If a project is executed with low eﬀort
on all tasks, it fails for sure since pl = 0 so that a negative surplus is created.
If pm is small enough so that the functions are suﬃciently complementary, it
is surplus-maximizing to have all tasks done with high eﬀort. Otherwise, it
is better to have only one task per project done with high eﬀort. Under the
M-form, this should be the low-cost tasks in order to minimize the costs.
Lemma 2 (U-Form) Let the tasks be exogenously assigned according to the
U-form. Performing all tasks with high eﬀort creates the surplus
S
U4 := 2(phX − 2αeh) , (16)
while performing only the low-cost tasks with high eﬀort results in the surplus
S
U2 := 2(pmX − αeh − αel) . (17)
Exerting high eﬀort on all tasks maximizes the surplus if and only if
pm ≤ ph −
α(eh − el)
X
=: ˜ pm (18)
while spending high eﬀort only on one task per project maximizes the surplus




U4} ≥ 0 . (19)
Proof: see Appendix A.
Again, it is surplus-maximizing to perform all tasks with high eﬀort if the
tasks are suﬃciently complementary. Otherwise, performing one task per
project with high eﬀort maximizes the surplus. Exerting low eﬀort on all
tasks creates again a negative surplus. Comparing the M- and U-form, the
critical value of pm is smaller in case of the M-form because the additional
costs from having two instead of one high eﬀort levels per project are higher
under the M-form. Now endogenize the organizational form.
Proposition 1 (First Best) Overall surplus is maximized if and only if
the U-form is implemented together with the surplus-maximizing eﬀort levels
from Lemma 2. If eﬀort is contractible, the principal implements a ﬁrst best
eﬃcient solution.
Proof: For any given eﬀort combination, the expected output is indepen-
dent of the organizational form, but eﬀort costs are minimized if the U-form
is chosen. Since eﬀorts are contractible, there is no need to incentivize the
agents. The principal can set the success premiums to zero and choose basic
wages which make the agents’ participation constraints binding. She always
extracts the whole surplus so that it is her objective to maximize it. 
12If eﬀort is contractible and the organizational form is endogenous, ﬁrst best
eﬃciency is always reached. The M-form is never eﬃcient due to the higher
eﬀort costs. In diﬀerence to the U-form, the M-form does not allow to gain
from the agents’ specialization resp. the scale economies.
4 Multi-Divisional Organizational Form
From now on, we assume eﬀort to be non-contractible. This section stud-
ies the impact of the multi-divisional organizational form or M-Form. Each
agent is in charge of one of the projects. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume that agent σ is assigned to the A-tasks and agent τ to the B-tasks.
Throughout this section, we take this assignment as exogenously given.
The eﬀort choice game of the agents is very simple under the M-form
since there is no interaction between the two agents’ decisions. We have
eAj = ejσ and eBj = ejτ for j = S,T. The equilibrium conditions boil down















An eﬀort combination fulﬁlling these conditions is also called incentive com-
patible. It can be implemented by the principal through the appropriate de-
sign of the contract, that is, the appropriate choice of the payment scheme.
Lemma 3 (Eﬀort Decisions M-form) Consider project A. Let vσ be large
enough to ensure agent σ’s participation. If (α + β)pm < αph, he always
chooses the same eﬀort level for both A-tasks. The principal can implement
high eﬀort on both tasks if and only if
wAσ ≥
(α + β)(eh − el)
ph
. (21)













13the principal can implement high eﬀort on the low-cost task AS and low eﬀort
on the high-cost task AT. Symmetric results hold for agent τ and project B.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Given the participation constraint is fulﬁlled, an agent’s decision is deter-
mined by the success premium he receives for his project. If the agent exerts
high eﬀort on exactly one task, he does so on his low-cost task. If the tasks
are highly complementary or the high-cost task is relatively cheap so that
(α+β)pm < αph, the agent never exerts diﬀerent eﬀort levels on his tasks.
Lemma 4 (Payoﬀs M-form) Take the M-form as given. If the principal




P := −2(α + β)el < 0 . (24)
If (α+β)pm ≥ αph, she can implement high eﬀort on the low cost tasks. She
extracts the whole surplus and receives
U
M2
P := 2(pmX − αeh − βel) . (25)
If she implements high eﬀort on all tasks, she extracts the whole surplus if
and only if
















If the principal implements low eﬀort on all tasks or high eﬀort on the low
cost tasks only, she receives the whole surplus. The principal covers the
agents’ costs in expectation, but does not need to provide further incentives.
If the tasks are suﬃciently complementary, this holds true also if the principal
implements high eﬀort on all tasks. Complementarity strongly incentivizes
the agents and the principal can extract the whole surplus. But if there is
little complementarity, she has to provide further incentives to implement
high eﬀort on all tasks. Due to limited liability, that means she has to oﬀer
the agents a positive share of the surplus.9
9Under unlimited liability, the principal could always combine an incentive compatible
success premium with a basic wage which makes the participation constraint binding since
she could, if necessary, choose a negative basic wage.
14Proposition 2 (Optimal Contracts M-form) Under the M-form, there
is a unique critical value p∗
m so that the following holds:
(i) If pm ≤ p∗
m, it is optimal for the principal to implement high eﬀort on
all tasks.
(ii) If pm ≥ p∗
m, it is optimal for the principal to implement high eﬀort on
the low-cost tasks only.
(iii) It is
0 = pl ≤ ˆ pm ≤ p
∗
m ≤ ¯ pm ≤ ph (28)
where ˆ pm is the kink of UM4
P , that is, it is the largest pm for which the
principal can implement hight eﬀort on all tasks whithout oﬀering the
agents a positive rent share. ¯ pm as deﬁned in Lemma 1 is the maximum
pm for which high eﬀort on all tasks is surplus-maximizing.




P } is positive.
Proof: see Appendix A.
If the tasks are highly complementary (so that pm ≤ ˆ pm), the principal can
maximize the surplus (given the M-form) and extract it completely. Due to
the complementarity, it is surplus-maximizing to implement high eﬀort on all
tasks. If there is less complementarity (so that pm ≥ ˆ pm), it is still surplus-
maximizing to implement high eﬀort on all tasks. But the principal can no
longer extract the whole surplus. Alternatively, the principal can implement
high eﬀort only on the low-cost tasks which creates a smaller surplus but
enables her to extract it completely. The principal faces a trade oﬀ between
surplus maximization and rent extraction due to limited liability. As long as
there is enough complementarity (so that pm ≤ p∗
m), this trade oﬀ is solved
in favor of surplus maximization. High eﬀort on all jobs is implemented.
The principal receives a smaller share but of a larger surplus. But the less
complementarity (resp. the more substitutability) is present, the harder it is
to incentivize the agents and the smaller is the principal’s rent share if she
implements high eﬀort on all tasks. At the same time, the surplus created
if she implements high eﬀort only on the low cost task diﬀers less from the
surplus created if all tasks are performed with high eﬀort. If there is enough
substitutability (so that pm ≥ p∗
m), the trade oﬀ is solved in favor of rent
extraction. The principal implements high eﬀort only on the low-cost tasks
and extracts the whole surplus. If there is even higher substitutability (so
15that pm ≥ ¯ pm), it is surplus-maximizing to have high eﬀort on the low-cost
tasks only and the trade oﬀ vanishes. The following section shows similar
results for the U-form.
5 Unitary Organizational Form
This section studies the impact of the unitary organizational form or U-form
in case of non-contractible eﬀort. Each agent is in charge of the tasks from
the same function, which we assume to be his low-cost task. Agent σ is as-
signed to the S-tasks and agent τ to the T-tasks. Throughout this section,
we take this assignment as exogenously given.
Again, there is no interaction between the projects. An agent’s eﬀort
choice on one project is independent of his choice on the other project. Dif-
ferent from the M-form, there is some interaction between the agents. If
the functions are suﬃciently complementary, an agent who knew the other
agent’s eﬀort choice on a project would prefer the same eﬀort level on this
project. In equilibrium, the agents choose the same eﬀort levels on a project.
In case of suﬃciently substitutable functions, each agent prefers an eﬀort level
diﬀerent from the other agent’s choice and in equilibrium, we have diﬀerent
eﬀort levels on a projects’ tasks.
Lemma 5 (Eﬀort Decisions U-form) Let vσ,vτ be large enough to ensure
the agents’ participation. The principal can implement high eﬀort on both A-













The principal can implement high eﬀort on AT and low eﬀort on AS if and
only if (30) holds with wAσ and wAτ interchanged. Symmetric results hold
true for project B.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Under the U-form, the principal disposes of more eﬀective instruments com-
pared to the M-form. She can target single tasks instead of whole projects
16only. Therefore, she can always implement any eﬀort combination. But since
we do not have a multi-task problem, this turns out not to be a comparative
advantage of the U-form.
Lemma 6 (Payoﬀs U-form) Take the U-form as given. If the principal




P := −4αel < 0 . (31)




P = 2(pmX − α(eh + el)) (32)
and she extracts the whole surplus. If she implements high eﬀort on all tasks,
she extracts the whole surplus if and only if
















Proposition 3 (Optimal Contracts U-form) Under the U-form, there is
a unique critical value p∗∗






P ⇐⇒ pm ≥ p
∗∗
m (35)
with equality if and only if pm = p∗∗
m.
(ii) It is
0 = pl ≤ ˇ pm ≤ p
∗∗
m ≤ ˜ pm ≤ ph (36)
where ˇ pm is the kink of UU4
P , that is, it is the largest pm for which the
principal can implement hight eﬀort on all tasks whithout oﬀering the
agents a positive rent share. ˜ pm as deﬁned in Lemma 2 is the maximum
pm for which high eﬀort on all tasks is surplus-maximizing.
Proof: see Appendix A.
17There are parameter constellations for which UU2
P ,UU4
P < 0 so that the prin-
cipal prefers to cancel the projects. If a cancellation is impossible, she might
prefer to implement low eﬀort on all tasks even though this generates a neg-
ative surplus. We skipped these details and restricted the proposition to the
results we need later on for a comparison of M- and U-form. Besides, the
results are quite similar to those of the M-form with ˇ p instead of ˆ p and ˜ p
instead of ¯ p. For p∗∗
m < pm < ˜ pm, limited liability creates some distortion. To
implement high eﬀort on all tasks would create a larger surplus, but the prin-
cipal had to share it with the agents. If pm / ∈ (p∗∗
m, ˜ pm), ﬁrst best eﬃciency
is reached.
6 Optimal Organizational Form
In this section, we endogenize the organizational form. When the principal
designs the contract, she chooses the assignment of tasks which is in fact
the organizational form. We restrict our analysis to a principal who chooses
between M-form and U-form since any other organizational form can increase
neither the surplus nor the principal’s payoﬀ. The U-form allows the principal
to gain from the agents’ specialization resp. the economies of scale, while
the M-form provides more eﬀective incentives. To see the latter, suppose
for the moment α = β which eliminates the eﬀects of the specialization.
To implement high eﬀort on one task per project, it is suﬃcient to cover
the agents’ costs without providing further incentives and both forms result
in the same payoﬀs. But under the M-form, the principal needs smaller
expected wage payments to incentivize the agents to exert high eﬀort on all
tasks. Incentives are more eﬀective under the M-form so that this form is
optimal. But if there is some specialization (resp. scale economies) so that
β > α, the U-form provides some cost savings. A trade oﬀ occurs between
eﬀort costs (which favor the U-form) and incentives (which favor the M-
form). The following Lemma compares the organizational forms for given
eﬀort combinations.
Lemma 7 (Given Eﬀort Combination) If the principal implements high
eﬀort on exactly one task per project, her payoﬀ under the U-form is always
larger than under the M-form, that is UU2
P > UM2
P . If the principal imple-
ments high eﬀort on all tasks so that she receives a payoﬀ UM4
P under the
M-form and UU4
P under the U-form, there is a unique critical value pI
m so
that the following holds:
(i) If β > 2α, it is UU4
P > UM4
P .
(ii) If β = 2α, it is UU4
P > UM4
P if pm < pI
m and UU4
P = UM4
P if pm ≥ pI
m.
18(iii) If β < 2α, it is UU4
P ≥ UM4
P ⇐⇒ pm ≤ pI
m with equality if and only if
pm = pI
m.
(iv) If β ≤ 2α, it is ˇ pm ≤ pI
m ≤ ˆ pm.
Proof: see Appendix A.
To implement high eﬀort on one task per project, the principal can simply
cover the agents’ costs and does not need to provide further incentives. Since
eﬀort costs are smaller under the U-form, this form is preferred. Given that
high eﬀort on all tasks is implemented, the cost savings under the U-form
might be outweighed by the more eﬀective incentives under the M-form if
there is not too much specialization or complementarity. To endogenize the
eﬀort combination, the following lemma is helpful.
Lemma 8 (Optimal Form) Remember that the principal’s payoﬀ is UM4
P
if she implements high eﬀort on all tasks under the M-form and UU2
P if she
implements high eﬀort on one task per project under the U-form. There is
a unique critical value pII
m so that UM4
P ≥ UU2
P if and only if pm ≥ pII
m with














≥ 0 . (37)
Proposition 4 (Optimal Form) The U-form is optimal if and only if
2α ≤ β or pm ≤ p
I
m or pm ≥ p
II
m . (38)
The M-form is optimal if and only if
2α ≥ β and p
I
m ≤ pm ≤ p
II
m . (39)
If there is a lot of specialization resp. economies of scale (so that β > 2α),
the U-form is always optimal independent of the complementarity of the
tasks. This is diﬀerent in case of a more moderate level of specialization.
First, consider the case pI
m ≤ pII
m. If the tasks are highly complementary
(so that pm < pI
m), the principal optimally chooses the U-form and imple-
ments high eﬀort on all tasks. The complementarity strongly incentivizes the
agents. As long as pm ≤ ˇ pm, she extracts the whole surplus, while in case
of ˇ pm < pm < pI
m she has to oﬀer the agents a positive share. As soon as
pm > pI
m, she still implements high eﬀort on all tasks, but prefers to use the
M-form. The generated surplus is smaller than under the U-form, but due
to the more eﬀective incentives she can extract a larger share. But if there
is too much substitutability (so that pm > pII
m), it is no longer proﬁtable to
19implement high eﬀort on all tasks. The principal implements high eﬀort on
one task per project. The comparative advantage of the M-form is lost and
the U-form is optimal. In case of pII
m < pI
m, the M-form is never optimal.
If there is so little complementarity that a principal who implements high
eﬀort on all tasks prefers the M-form, this is already enough substitutability
to make it proﬁtable to implement high eﬀort on one task per project and
again the U-form is optimal.
We have shown that a necessary condition (besides β ≤ 2α) for the M-
form to be optimal is pI
m ≤ pII
m, which is equivalent to p0
m ≥ 0 according
to Lemma 7. To interpret this condition, note that p0
m is increasing in ph
and X, decreasing in β and el and decreasing if eh,el are increased keeping
eh−el constant. If ph and X are small, it is not beneﬁcial to implement high
eﬀort on all tasks so that there is no need for incentives and the M-form
is not used. To increase el,eh keeping eh − el constant does not change the
equilibrium conditions for implementing high eﬀort on all tasks, but increases
the eﬀort costs. Potential cost savings become more important, which favors
the U-form. If el is increased while keeping eh constant, the eﬀort costs for
implementing high eﬀort on all tasks remain the same while eh−el decreases.
The equilibrium conditions for implementing high eﬀort on all tasks change,
it becomes less expensive to incentivize the agents. The potential advantage
of the M-form withers.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a simple model of the assignment of tasks, which com-
pares diﬀerent organizational forms. While the M-form is a process-based
organizational form, the U-form is a function-based one. The U-form allows
for some cost savings from the agents’ specialization or economies of scale,
but on the other hand provides less eﬀective incentives compared to the M-
form. The M-form can be optimal if and only if the functional areas are
neither too complementary nor too substitutable.
To summarize, the principal favors the M-form if the following is fulﬁlled:
First, possible cost savings from specialization resp. scale economies have to
be small, due to little specialization and generally small eﬀort cost. Second,
it has to be attractive to implement high eﬀort on all tasks since marginal
returns to eﬀort (ph − pm)X are large, implying that there is not too much
substitutability. Third, it has to be expensive to incentivize the agents to
spend high eﬀort on all tasks, due to large marginal eﬀort costs (driven by
20eh − el) and little complementarity. Under these conditions, the incentive
eﬀects of the M-form outweigh the cost savings of the U-form.
In our model, we restrict the diﬀerences between the two organizational
forms to the assignment of tasks. But the economies of scale we assume for
the U-form might well be a result of a more centralized structure which on
the other hand enables some free riding. The M-form provides more eﬀective
incentives since any kind of team problem is absent, which ﬁts into the inter-
pretation of a more decentralized structure. Even though we do not model
(de)centralization explicitly, we are in line with the idea of the organizational
form representing diﬀerent levels of centralization.
Our main results still hold true if we allow for pl ≥ 0. If pl > 0, the
principal needs to provide incentives not only to implement high eﬀort on
all tasks but also to implement high eﬀort on one task per project. In case
of extreme complementarity or substitutability, the U-form remains optimal
since it is relatively easy for the principal to implement the desired eﬀort
combinations. In case of less extreme complementarity resp. substitutabil-
ity, incentives are harder to provide so that it might be optimal to use the
M-form. Furthermore, there might be a set of intermediate pm for which the
principal chooses not to provide any incentives and implement low eﬀort on
all tasks so that the U-form is clearly optimal. This set of pm is empty if pl
is very small or even zero.
In order to obtain clearcut results about the substitutability resp. com-
pementarity of the functional areas, we have restricted the model to a simple
one-layer hierarchy. A model with a more complex hierarchical structure
which allows to model the amount of (de)centralization explicitly could pro-
vide further insights to the diﬀerences between M- and U-form and combine
our results with, for example, the overload considerations of Aghion and
Tirole (1995) or Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005). Other possible ex-
tensions include sequential eﬀort choices or collusion of the agents. These
are left for future research.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
It is straightforward to calculate SM2 and SM4. Due to the symmetry, the
surplus-maximizing eﬀort combination has the same number of high eﬀort
levels for both projects. If a project’s tasks are undertaken with diﬀerent
eﬀort levels, eﬀort costs are minimized if the agent in charge of this project
works with high eﬀort on his low-cost task. To work with low eﬀort on all
tasks creates a negative surplus. The only remaining candidates for a maxi-
mum of the surplus are SM2 and SM4. ¯ p is the intersection of SM2 and SM4
with SM2 ≤ SM4 ⇐⇒ pm ≤ ¯ p with equality if and only if pm = ¯ p. It is
SM = max{SM2,SM4} ≥ 0 since SM4 ≥ 0 by assumption. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
The proof is analog to the the proof of Lemma 1. It is straightforward to
calculate SU2 and SU4. To work with low eﬀort on all tasks creates a negative
surplus. ˜ p is the intersection of SU2 and SU4 with SU2 ≤ SU4 ⇐⇒ pm ≤ ˜ p
with equality if and only if pm = ˜ pm. It is SU = max{SU2,SU4} ≥ 0 since
SU4 ≥ 0 by assumption. 
Proof of Lemma 3:
Due to the M-form, we have eAS = eSσ and eAT = eTσ. The equilibrium con-
ditions of the eﬀort choice game are simply the agents’ incentive constraints.








since all other terms of his payoﬀ function are independent of his choice. The
principal can implement any eﬀort combination which fulﬁlls (40). For the
agent, it is alway strictly dominated to choose eAS = el,eAT = eh since the
agent can reach the same success probability less costly with eAS = eh,eAT =
el. Straight forward calculations show that the choice eAS = eh,eAT = el is







Such a wAσ exists if and only if (α + β)pm ≥ αph. If this is the case,





24If (α + β)pm < αph, agent σ chooses between eAS = eAT = eh and eAS =
eAT = el. The former is incentive compatible if and only if
wAσ ≥
(α + β)(eh − el)
ph
. (43)
Due to the symmetry, everything is analog for agent τ and project B. 
Proof of Lemma 4:
Given an eﬀort combination eAS,eAT,eBS,eBT to be implemented, the prin-



















the participation constraints Uσ,Uτ ≥ 0 and the limited liability constraints
wij,vj ≥ 0.
The principal cannot gain from choosing wσB > 0 or wτA > 0. These
payments do not incentivize the agents and the participation constraints can
be ensured via vσ,vτ as well. We set wAτ = wBσ = 0. Due to the symmetry,
the principal can choose vσ = vτ := v and wAσ = wBτ := w. Given an eﬀort
combination to be implemented, it is optimal for the principal to choose the
smallest w ≥ 0 which ensures incentive compatibility and the smallest v ≥ 0
which ensures the agents’ participation. To ﬁnd w, see Lemma 3. We plug
this w into Uσ = 0 and solve for v. If the result is non-negative, it is the
optimal basic wage and the agents’ participation constraints are binding. If
the result is negative, we set v := 0 and the participation constraints are not
binding.10
To implement low eﬀort on all tasks, it is optimal to choose w = 0 and
v = (α + β)el, which results in a payoﬀ
U
M0
P := −2(α + β)el < 0 (46)
which equals the generated surplus. Let pm < αph/(α + β). According to
Lemma 3, it is impossible to implement diﬀerent eﬀort levels for an agent’s
10Under unlimited liability, the principal could also choose a negative v and therefore
ensure that the participation constraints are binding.
25tasks. To implement high eﬀort on all tasks, it is optimal to choose w =
(α + β)(eh − el)/ph and v = (α + β)el. The resulting payoﬀ is
U
M4c
P = 2(phX − (α + β)eh) ≥ 0 . (47)
Let pm ≥ αph/(α+β). To implement high eﬀort on all tasks, it is optimal

















and equals the generated surplus if and only if pm ≤ ˆ pm. Since αph/(α+β) <
ˆ pm, we can combine UM4c
P and UM4
P . A principal who implements high eﬀort
on all tasks receives a payoﬀ UM4
P .
But if pm ≥ αph/(α + β), the principal can implement high eﬀort on
the low-cost tasks only. To implement this, it is optimal to choose w =
α(eh − el)/pm and v = (α + β)el. The payoﬀ is
U
M2
P = 2(pmX − αeh − βel) (50)
which equals the generated surplus. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Due to the symmetry, it is optimal for the principal to implement the same
eﬀort combination on both projects. There are three candidates for an opti-
mum: low eﬀort on all tasks, high eﬀort on the low cost tasks, high eﬀort on
all tasks. To ﬁnd the optimum, compare the payoﬀs from Lemma 4.
Consider the payoﬀs as functions of pm. For the moment, make the ad
hoc assumption that it is never optimal to implement low eﬀort on all tasks
and compare the two remaining candidates. It is optimal to implement high
eﬀort only on the low-cost tasks if UM2
P ≥ UM4
P and pm ≥ αph/(α + β).
The function UM4
P is continuous and has a kink in ˆ pm. UM4
P is a positive
constant for pm ≤ ˆ pm. It is monotone decreasing in pm for pm ≥ ˆ pm and
approaches −∞ for pm → ph. The function UM2
P is continuous and mono-
tone increasing in pm. It is negative for pm = 0 and positive for pm = ph.
Therefore, we have a unique intersection p∗. We have UM2
P ≥ UM4
P if and
26only if pm ≥ p∗ with equality if and only if pm = p∗. For pm = αph/(α + β),
we have UM4
P ≥ UM2
P so that p∗ > αph/(α+β) and UM2
P can be implemented
whenever UM2
P ≥ UM4
P . In summary, high eﬀort on the low cost tasks is
optimal if and only if pm ≥ p∗
m and we have shown (ii).
Remember that ¯ pm is the intersection of UM2
P and 2(phX − (α + β)eh).
Since ¯ pm ≥ ˆ pm, we have ˆ pm ≤ p∗




If pm < αph/(α + β), high eﬀort on the low cost tasks only cannot be
implemented. If αph/(α + β) ≤ pm, we have UM4
P ≥ UM2
P ⇐⇒ pm ≤ p∗
m.
Together, it is optimal to implement high eﬀort on all tasks if and only if
pm ≤ p∗
m, and we have shown (i).









P (ˆ pm) ≥ 0 implies UM
P ≥ 0. Our ad hoc assumption
is justiﬁed and we have also shown (iv). 
Proof of Lemma 5:
Due to the U-form, we have eσ = (eAS,eBS),eτ = (eAT,eBT),eAS+eBS = eSσ




























BS,eBT)wBτ − αeBT . (54)
For notational simplicity, we suppress the asterisk. Consider project A.
Given eAS = eh, agent τ’s best response (which maximizes his payoﬀ be-
cause it fulﬁlls (52)) is eAT = eh if and only if
phwAτ − αeh ≥ pmwAτ − αel (55)





If wAτ ≤ α(eh −el)/(ph −pm), his best response is eAT = el. Given eAS = el,
agent τ’s best response is eAT = eh if and only if






If wAτ ≤ α(eh−el)/pm, his best response is eAS = el. Agent σ’s best responses
are constructed analog. Combining the agents’ best responses shows that









wAτ ≤ α(eh − el)/pm . (60)
For an equilibrium with eAσ = el,eAτ = eh, replace wAσ ↔ wAτ so that the
agents change their roles. Due to the symmetry, everything is completely
analog for project B.

Proof of Lemma 6:
The proof is quite analog to the proof of Lemma 4. Given an eﬀort combina-





subject to the equilibrium conditions (51)-(54), the participation constraints
Uσ,Uτ ≥ 0 and the limited liability constraints wij,vj ≥ 0.
Due to the symmetry, the principal can choose vσ = vτ := v and wAσ =
wBτ := w1 and wBσ = wAτ := w2. Given an eﬀort combination to be im-
plemented, it is optimal for the principal to choose the smallest w1,w2 ≥ 0
which fulﬁll the equilibrium conditions and the smallest v ≥ 0 which ensures
the agents’ participation. To ﬁnd w1,w2, see Lemma 5. We plug these w1,w2
into Uσ = 0 and solve for v. If the result is non-negative, it is the optimal
basic wage and the agents’ participation constraints are binding. If the result
is negative, we set v := 0 and the participation constraints are not binding.
To implement low eﬀort on all tasks, it is optimal to set w1 = w2 = 0 and
v = 2αel. The resulting payoﬀ is
U
M0
P := −4αel < 0 (62)
28which equals the generated surplus. To implement high eﬀort on exactly one
task per project, it is optimal to choose w1 = α(eh − el)/pm,w2 = 0 and
v = 2αel. The payoﬀ is
U
U2
P = 2(pmX − α(eh + el)) . (63)
which equals the generated surplus. To implement high eﬀort on all tasks, it
is optimal to choose w1 = w2 = α(eh −el)/(ph −pm) and v = max{0,2αeh −
















and equals the generated surplus if and only if pm ≤ ˇ pm. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof is quite analog to the proof of Proposition 2. UU4
P is a positive
constant for pm ≤ ˇ pm. It is monotone decreasing in pm for pm ≥ ˇ pm and
approaches −∞ for pm → ph. The function UU2
P is continuous and mono-
tone increasing in pm. It is negative for pm = 0 and positive for pm = ph.
Therefore, we have a unique intersection p∗∗ with UU2
P ≤ UU4
P if and only if
pm ≤ p∗∗ with equality if and only if pm = p∗∗, and we have shown (i).
Remember that ˜ pm is the intersection of UU2
P and 2(phX − 2αeh). Since
˜ pm ≥ ˇ pm, we have ˇ pm ≤ p∗∗




Proof of Lemma 7:
Since UU2
P ≥ UM2
P , a principal who implements high eﬀort on one task per
project always prefers the U-form. Now consider a principal who implements
high eﬀort on all tasks. In case of β > 2α, we have UU4
P > UM4
P , which is
(i). Now let β ≤ 2α. It is straightforward that ˇ pm ≤ ˆ pm. For pm ≤ ˇ pm, it is
UU4
P > UM4
P and both functions are constant. For pm ≥ ˆ pm, it is UU4
P ≤ UM4
P
with equality if and only if β = 2α. Both functions are decreasing. For
ˇ pm < pm < ˆ pm, UM4
P is constant while UU4
P is decreasing. It is implied that
for β < 2α, there is a unique intersection pI
m with UM4
P ≥ UU4
P ⇐⇒ pm ≥ pI
m
with equality if and only if pm = pI
m and we have shown (iii). For β = 2α,
we have UU4
P > UM4
P if pm < ˆ pm and UU4
P = UM4
P if pm ≥ ˆ pm. This is (ii)
with ˆ pm = pI
m. Combining the properties of pI
m for β < 2α and β = 2α, we
get (iv). 
29Proof of Lemma 8:
Since UU2
P is strictly increasing, negative in pm = 0 and positive in pm = ph
while UM4
P is decreasing, positive in pm = 0 and approaches −∞ for pm → ph
we have a unique intersection of UM4
P and UU2
P which we denote with pII
m. It




(β − α)eh + 2αel
(α + β)eh
. (66)
Furthermore, there is a unique intersection of UU2






















There are two cases to analyze. If UM4










m > 0. If UM4






















m ≥ 0 . (72)

Proof of Proposition 4:
The M-form guarantees a payoﬀ UM
P ≥ 0 so that it is never optimal to
implement low eﬀort on all tasks, which results in a negative payoﬀ. It is
UM2
P < UU2
P . The U-form is optimal if and only if max{UU4
P ,UU2
P } ≥ UM4
P .
The M-form is optimal if and only if max{UU4
P ,UU2
P } ≤ UM4
P . The results
follow from Lemma 7 and Lemma 8. 
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